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BANK CREDIT CARDS AND THE TIMING OF
DEDUCTIONS UNDER REVENUE RULING 78-38:
A RETURN TO CONSISTENCY
Although credit cards have existed more than fifty years, their use as
a major instrument did not become significant until the past twenty-five
years.' In 1950, the Diner's Club, Inc. issued the first multiparty indepen-
dent credit card,2 followed by the American Express Company in 1958 and
Bank of America in 1959. 3 Since that time the number of cardholder ac-
counts has grown to over fifty million, representing approximately eleven
billion dollars of credit.' In light of this phenomenal growth, commentators
I For a general discussion of the growth and historical development of credit cards, see
generally Bergsten, Credit Cards - A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 485 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bergsten]; Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards:
New Cash or New Credit, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1033 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brandel &
Leonard]; Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALF. L.
REV. 459 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Tripartite Credit]; Survey, Toward a Less-Check
Society, 47 NoTRe DAME LAw. 1163 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Less-Check Society]. For an
extensive discussion of the commercial aspects of multiparty credit cards, see generally
Clontz, Bank Credit Cards Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 BANKNG L.J. 888 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Clontz]; Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 VAL. L. REv. 218 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davenport].
2 Bergsten, supra note 1, at 485; Davenport, supra note 1, at 218-19. A multiparty plan
is a credit card plan involving three or more parties. Reference in this article will be made
primarily to the tripartite plan (three-party plan) and not to two-party or four-party plans.
The two-party plan is based on an agreement between two parties, the merchant and the
cardholder. See note 17 infra. The three-party plan typically involves a cardholder, merchant,
and the issuer of the card. See text accompanying notes 21-30 infra. In the four-party arrange-
ment, the functions of the issuer in the three-party plan are divided between two parties, the
entity that issues the credit card and promotes the plan and the bank which acts as a central
clearinghouse for the billing and collection of cardholder accounts. Claflin, The Credit Card
-A New Instrument, 33 CoNN. B.J. 1 (1959); Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1187 n.119.
2Bergsten, supra note 1, at 485; Davenport, supra note 1, at 218-19.
' B. CLARK & A. SQuILAM, THE LAw oF BANK DEPosrrs, CoLLECnONS, AND CREDrr CARDs
189 supp. (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CLARK & SQUiLLANTE]. The volume
of business transacted by even a single credit card company can be enormous. The American
Express Company has issued over two million cards, honored by more than 140,000 establish-
ments and has accounted for an annual business of approximately $780,000,000. Davenport,
supra note 1, at 220. This extraordinary growth of bank credit cards is understandable in light
of their benefits. For example, the cardholder may carry a single credit card conveniently
instead of checks and cash. In addition, he can make large purchases and defer payments
over a long pdriod of time. A cardholder may also use the card in literally thousands of
establishments around the United States and the world, eliminating the difficulty of check
acceptance by merchants. Moreover, the cardholder is protected more fully against loss due
to theft or destruction of the card than with checks. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 1, at
1039. The acceptance of the credit card by the merchant may even be safer than cash since
he is protected against the risk of counterfeit currency. Id. at 1040. The merchant also benefits
by receiving immediate credit or cash from the deposit of his credit card sales slip at the
issuing bank. Davenport, supra note 1, at 233. He is protected by the terms of the issuer-
merchant agreement from the risks normally associated with accepting payment in a form
other than cash, such as check forgery or insufficient funds in the drawer's account. Brandel
& Leonard, supra note 1, at 1040. Finally, the merchant receives the benefit of widespread
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have forecast fundamental changes in the nature of commercial law.5 For
example, commentators note a rapidly increasing movement from a "cash-
paying" and "check-paying" society to a credit card society.' Despite this
trend, no specific body of law presently covers credit cards.' In the area of
federal income taxation, legislation directly affecting credit cards has been
virtually nonexistent.8
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), however, recently has attempted
to clarify the application of timing principles with regard to deductions
involving the use of credit cards. In 1971, the IRS published Revenue
Ruling 71-2161 which concerned the proper time when a cash basis tax-
payer'" may claim an income tax deduction for a transaction effected by a
multiparty credit card payment." Recently, this ruling was revoked by the
use of the bank card, enabling cardholders to make impulse or spot purchases which would
not be possible if they lacked sufficient currency or funds in their checking accounts. See
generally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 117, at 348 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as NORDSTROM]; Brandel & Leonard, supra note 1, at 1037-40; Clontz, supra note 1, at
896; Davenport, supra note 1, at 233.
' See generally Barnes, The Law, The Credit Card and the Coming of the Checkless
Society, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 641 (1968); Brandel & Leonard, supra note 1; Less-Check Society,
supra note 1.
' J. FREELAND, S. LIND, & R. STEPHENS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF FED-
ERAL INcOME TAXATON 552 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS].
7 The lack of legal guidelines in the area of tripartite credit cards may be explained by
the fact that they are a relatively new creation of commercial law. See Cleveland, The Bank,
The Merchant and The Credit Card User, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 17, 20-21 (1973) (first tripartite
credit card did not appear until 1950). Although many commentators have called for inclu-
sion, the Uniform Commercial Code contains no provisions concerning the use of credit cards.
NORDSTROM, supra note 4, § 117, at 347; Davenport, supra note 1, at 223-24. Many states have
enacted credit card statutes, but their coverage has been limited to theft, forgery, and unau-
thorized use of tripartite cards. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484(e) - 484(i) (West 1970 &
Supp. 1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 511-517 (McKinney Supp. 1977). Courts also have been
ineffectual in providing guidelines in the credit card area. Although the first credit card case
was litigated more than sixty years ago, Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. D. 778 (Phila. Mun.
Ct. 1915), subsequent litigation has been confined largely to the issue of consumer liability
for unauthorized purchases. Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1187, 1192.
NORDSTROM, supra note 4, § 117, at 347; Davenport, supra note 1, at 223-24.
1971-1 C.B. 96.
" Under the cash basis method of income tax accounting, a taxpayer is required to
include in gross income all items actually or constructively received during the taxable year.
See, e.g., Estate of Geiger v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1012 (1966) (credit to taxpayer's bank account is constructive receipt); Lavery v. Com-
missioner, 158 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1946) (receipt of a check is constructive receipt). Expendi-
tures must be deducted in the taxable year in which they are actually paid. Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1 (a)(1), T.D. 6282, 1973-2 C.B. 163; see text accompanying notes 67-74 infra.
11 1971-1 C.B. 96. The deduction claimed in Revenue Ruling 71-216 was a charitable
contribution. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) allows a taxpayer to claim certain contributions to qualified
charities made during the taxable year as deductions from income. For an extensive discus-
sion of the tax aspects of charitable contributions, see B. HoPms, THE LAW OF TAx-ExEmPT
ORGANIZATIONS 38-124 (2d ed. 1977); Myers, Charitable Contributions, 4 IND. L. Rxv. 217




publication of Revenue Ruling 78-38.'1 The prior ruling held that a deduc-
tion from gross income claimed for an expense incurred through the use of
a bank credit card was available only at the time the cardholder paid the
bank." The new ruling changes the permissible time for claiming a deduc-
tion to the time of the credit card transaction." This change in timing
principles has a significant impact on the tax accounting aspects of deduc-
tions,'5 which is most evident when deductions in the latter part of the
taxable year are claimed." To understand the effect and ramifications of
the change in the IRS's position, an understanding of the nature and
mechanics of credit cards and banking practices is required.
There are two basic types of credit cards: bipartite (two-party) and
tripartite (three-party). Under the bipartite plan, a merchant'7 issues a
credit card to a customer permitting the customer to make purchases
exclusively from that merchant with the card and to complete payment at
a later date.'" This enables the customer to pay his bill in monthly install-
ments, which include a service charge based on the amount of each out-
standing monthly balance." Thus, the agreement involves only the seller
,2 1978-5 I.R.B. 7.
,2 1971-1 C.B. at 96.
" 1978-5 I.R.B. at 8.
, See text accompanying notes 90-108 infra.
,S A taxable year is defined as "(1) the taxpayer's annual accounting period, if it is a
calendar year or fiscal year; (2) the calendar year ... ; or (3) the period for which the return
is made, if a return is made for a period of less than 12 months." I.R.C. § 441(b). Under
Revenue Ruling 71-216, the taxpayer was faced with a confusing situation at the end of the
taxable year. If the taxpayer used a credit card to charge a charitable contribution on Decem-
ber 20th of one year, he could not claim a deduction until he received his monthly statement
from his issuing bank in January of the subsequent year. Thus, obligations incurred in a
previous taxable year were shifted to the following year. In addition, the timing of the tax-
payer's deduction was subject to the control of a party other than the taxpayer, namely the
merchant. The time at which the merchant sent his sales slips to the issuing bank for credit
determined to a large extent the time at which the bank billed the cardholder/taxpayer and,
correspondingly, the time when a deduction could be computed and claimed.
'1 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a merchant is defined as "a person who deals
in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction . . ." U.C.C. § 2-
104(1)(1972 version). In the credit card transaction, the merchant is typically a seller of goods
or services who receives the customer's credit card charge as payment for the underlying
obligation. See text accompanying notes 24-30 infra. Since credit cards can be used to pay
for items other than goods or services, however, the merchant is not the only person who
receives payment by a credit card charge. In the case of a charitable contribution, the charity
stands in the position of the merchant for purposes of payment by assuming the rights and
liabilities of the merchant-issuer agreement. See text accompanying notes 31-40 infra. Here-
inafter, the term "merchant" will refer to any party who receives value or payment by a credit
card charge, including a seller of goods or a charitable organization.
" Most large department stores and retail chains issue bipartite credit cards to their
customers. The majority of credit cards issued by the major gasoline companies fall into this
category as well. See FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENs, supra note 6, at 553. If the IRS classifies
a particular arrangement as bipartite, rather than tripartite, the resulting effects on federal
income tax timing principles are significant, especially as to the proper taxable year in which
a deduction can be claimed by a charge to a credit card. See note 92 infra.
" Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1188. When a sale occurs with the use of a
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and buyer.2" In contrast, the tripartite bank credit card plan generally
consists of three parties and three agreements: (1) an agreement between
the issuing bank and the cardholder, 2' (2) an agreement between the issu-
ing bank and the merchant,2 and (3) an agreement between the card-
holder and the merchant evidencing the sale or transfer of value.2 In the
typical three-party credit card transaction involving a sale of merchan-
dise, the cardholder first selects an item from the merchant and then pays
for it by using a bank credit card.2 Upon presentation, the merchant places
the credit card into an imprinter, embossing the cardholder information
from the face of the card onto a sales slip.26 After the cardholder signs the
sales slip,2 the merchant is free to deposit the receipt or "chit" with a
depositary bank with whom he has an issuer-merchant agreement. The
merchant's account is credited immediately for the amount of the card-
holder sale, less any discount, upon deposit of the chit.2 Finally, the issuer
will bill2 the cardholder for payment of this purchase and other transac-
bipartite card, the arrangement resembles a normal extension of credit by the merchant to
the cardholder/buyer. The seller has agreed to deliver the goods to the buyer on the strength
of the buyer's credit. In return, the buyer has agreed to pay for the goods within a time period
set by the seller, normally thirty days. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 4, § 117, at 347-48.
2 A seller may enlist the services of a third party, the collection agency, if the buyer
defaults on his installment payments for purchases obtained with his bipartite credit card.
In this situation, the seller will typically assign the two-party contract to the agency for
collection, less an agreed discount. See NoRDsTRoM, supra note 4, at §§ 163-66.
22 For an illustration of an issuer-cardholder agreement, see Clontz, supra note 1, at 909;
Davenport, supra note 1, at 247.
22 For an illustration of an issuer-merchant agreement, see Clontz, supra note 1, at 906-
07; Davenport, supra note 1, at 248-51. Under the tripartite credit card plan, the term
"issuer" is commonly used to denote the corporation that creates and operates the credit card
plan and all of the member banks that participate in the particular bank credit card system.
Davenport, supra note 1, at 225.
" See CLARK & SQuiLLANTR, supra note 4, at 189-90.
U See generally NoRDsTRoM, supra note 4, § 117, at 348.
" See Clontz, supra note 1, at 905; Davenport, supra note 1, at 226-27.
" For an illustration of a sample sales or cash advance slip, see Clontz, supra note 1, at
908; Davenport, supra note 1, at 252-53.
l In many cases, before a merchant permits the buyer to sign the sales slip, he may be
required by the credit card issuer to check the card number against a list of "hot cards"
provided by the issuer. Davenport, supra note 1, at 227-28 nn. 39-40. A "hot eard" is defined
as a credit card that has been lost or stolen and reported to the issuer. Id. The "hot card"
may be distinguished from a "wild card," which is a credit card that has been revoked by
the issuer because the cardholder exceeded his approved credit limit. Id.; Less-Check Society,
supra note 1, at 1190 n.127.
a The deposit of the chit with a depositary bank can be classified as the sale of an
account by the merchant to the issuer of the bank credit card or as an assignment of the
contractual right of payment for a discounted price. NoRnsTRoM, supra note 7, § 117, at 348.
" The actual billing process can be extremely complicated and can involve more than
one bank in the clearinghouse process of charging a cardholder's account. The bank in which
the merchant deposits his sales slip from a particular sale to the cardholder may not be the
bank involved in the issuer-cardholder contract. If the depositary bank and issuing bank are
separated by a great distance, the billing process may involve two or more regional clearing
associations and several banks. Brandel & Leonard, supra note 1, at 1036.
[Vol. XXXV
BANK CREDIT CARDS
tions conducted with the credit card on a monthly basis."
The rights and liabilities that exist in the tripartite credit card plan are
dependent upon the three separate agreements between the parties in-
volved in the credit card transaction. Under the "issuer-merchant" agree-
ment, the merchant usually agrees to promote the particular credit card
plan by displaying the plan's emblem in his establishment 1 and to honor
all credit cards which have been presented by cardholders.32 The merchant
further promises to sell to cardholders at the regular price and to record
the sale on a sales form which subsequently is sent to the issuer bank.3
The issuer bank generally will credit the merchant's account with a dis-
counted amount of the total of all sales slips which are sent to the issuer
by the merchant.3 In return for the merchant's promise to honor all valid
cards presented by the issuer's cardholders, the issuer also furnishes im-
printers, sales slips, credit slips and promotional materials to the mer-
chant."
The second agreement involved in a tripartite plan exists between the
cardholder and the merchant and is illustrated by the sales agreement
underlying the purchase of the goods or service. This contract is usually
one implied by law since the sales slip normally will not embody any terms
or obligations concerning the sale of the merchandise or services. Thus,
general principles of contract law typically will govern the sales transaction
between the merchant and cardholder.1 If the transaction involves the sale
of "goods,"" Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies." In many
respects, the merchant-cardholder relationship is similar to that found in
See CLARK & SQuiijAr, supra note 4, at 210-11 supp.; Davenport, supra note 1, at
231-32.
' See Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1188.
2 Davenport, supra note 1, at 228 n.41; Comment, Bank Credit Cards-Contemporary
Problems, 41 FoRnHAm L. REv. 373, 374 (1972); Note, Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit
Card Transactions, 81 YALE L.J. 287, 291 n.19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Preserving
Defenses].
3 Under the issuer-merchant contract, the merchant generally is required to deliver the
sales slip to the issuer within three business days following the sale of the merchandise to
the cardholder. Davenport, supra note 1, at 228. Following completion of this procedure, the
merchant's account is then credited by the issuer. Id.; Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at
1188; see text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
u The actual amount of the discount is usually computed on the basis of volume of sales
over a monthly or quarterly time period. Davenport, supra note 1, at 228-29 n.45. In some
instances, the discount is based on the average purchase amount for sales slips in the mer-
chant's trade. Id. The amount of the discount ranges from three percent for most retailers to
five percent for grocery stores, barber shops and liquor stores. Id.
Id. at 230.
NORDSTROM, supra note 4, § 117, at 347.
In the commercial sense, goods are defined as "all things .. which are movable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is
to be paid, investment securities. . . and things in action." U.C.C. § 2-105(1)(1972 version).
31 Davenport, supra note 1, at 230 n.53. The sales slip of the credit card transaction
between the cardholder and merchant represents a commemoration of the underlying sales
contract. Id.
1978] 1093
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a bipartite credit card transaction. 9 There is one significant difference,
however. While the cardholder under the tripartite plan promises to pay
the third-party issuer of the credit card, the bipartite cardholder is re-
quired to pay the merchant."
The "issuer-cardholder" agreement is created when the application by
a potential cardholder is accepted by the issuer.41 The contract authorizes
the issuer of the card to pay for all purchases on behalf of the cardholder.2
The cardholder, in turn, promises the issuer that he will pay for all credit
which has been extended by the issuer. 4 The customer further promises
that he will make payments to the issuer within the specified time periods
set out in the contract," pay for all purchases charged to the card even if
there is a dispute with the merchant-seller,45 retain his outstanding ac-
count balance below his approved credit line," reimburse the issuer for all
purchases made through the use of the card by any person prior to its
surrender, destruction, or receipt of written notice of loss or theft by the
issuer,' and surrender the credit card on demand .
8
These agreements between the parties involved in the tripartite credit
card plan and the commercial practices governing the use of multiparty
bank credit cards have a significant impact on the federal income tax
system in the area of deductions. Since 1971, the IRS has responded to the
increasing use of credit cards by promulgating Revenue Ruling 71-21611 and
Revenue Ruling 78-38.0 Revenue Ruling 71-216, issued in 1971, held that
the amount of a contribution made to a charitable organization" by a
3' See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra.
0 Comment, Bank Credit Plans: Innovations in Consumer Financing, 1 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 49, 58 (1968); Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1190; see Preserving Defenses, supra
note 32, at 292 nn. 21-22.
, Clontz, supra note 1, at 894; Davenport, supra note 1, at 226.
" Davenport, supra note 1, at 227; Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1190-91.
' Davenport, supra note 1, at 227; Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1190-91.
"The specified time period in which the cardholder will be required to make payment
to the issuer depends upon whether he elects to pay the full amount due in a single payment
or decides to pay the amount in installments. For example, the cardholder normally has
twenty-five days from the date the statement is sent by the issuer to remit the full specified
amount. Davenport, supra note 1, at 227. Otherwise, the cardholder is permitted to pay a
percentage of the total amount billed, usually five to ten percent, or a designated minimum
amount each month, usually ten dollars, with interest. Id. The rate of interest charged by
the issuer is commonly one and one-half percent of the outstanding balance, computed on a
monthly basis. See Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1191. The maximum amount allowa-
ble under most consumer laws is two percent per month. See, e.g., UNwIRM CONSUmER CREDrr
CODE § 2.202(3) (1974 version) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.].
43 Davenport, supra note 1, at 227.
+ Id.; Less-Check Society, supra note 1, at 1191.
' A lost or stolen credit card is considered a "hot card". See note 26 supra. Potential
liability of the cardholder to the issuer in this area has been limited to fifty dollars. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1643 (1976).
" The typical contract between the issuer and the cardholder usually provides that the
credit card is at all times the property of the issuer. Davenport, supra note 1, at 227, 247.
11 1971-1 C.B. 96.
10 1978-5 I.R.B. 7.
", I.R.C. § 170(c).
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charge to a bank credit card is deductible in the year the cardholder pays
the amount to the issuing bank. "2 In 1978, following criticism of the 1971
ruling by some commentators,O the IRS published Revenue Ruling 78-38
which revoked the prior ruling and held that a contribution made by a
charge to a three-party bank credit card is deductible in the year the
charge is made regardless of when the bank is paid."
Although Ruling 71-216 and Ruling 78-38 refer specifically to charitable
deductions, the rationale of the rulings is applicable to all deductions
claimed by the use of a bank credit card. The IRS published Revenue
Ruling 78-39" simultaneously with Ruling 78-38, which holds that the use
of a bank credit card to pay an expense for medical care qualifies as the
payment of a medical expense deduction" in the year the credit card
charge is made, regardless of when the bank is paid. 7 Both 1978 Rulings
use identical reasoning to reach the same conclusion. In all three rulings
the IRS relies on basic principles of cash basis accounting' applicable to
other deductions besides charitable contributions" and medical expenses."
Arguably, the IRS meant for the rulings to apply to all deductible expenses
incurred by the use of a bank credit card, 1 and not merely to deductions
for charitable contributions and medical expenses. This would expand the
scope of the new timing principles espoused in Revenue Ruling 78-38 and
Revenue Ruling 78-39 to such deductions as business travel expenses, 2
moving expenses, 3 business entertainment expenses" and political contri-
butions.5 This approach is consistent with the phenomenal growth of
credit cards in recent years6 and would evidence IRS recognition that bank
credit cards will be used increasingly in claiming deductions under the
federal laws of income taxation.
Under section 441 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),"7 income taxes
are computed on the basis of taxable income"8 received over a twelve
" 1971-1 C.B. at 96.
u See FREELAND, LIND, & STEHEN, supra note 6, at 552-53; Comment, The "Instant
Deduction Approach" to the Multiparty Credit Card Transaction: A Proposal, 21 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 1380 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Instant Deduction].
" 1978-5 I.R.B. 7.
" 1978-5 I.R.B. 8.
" I.R.C. § 213.
17 1978-5 I.R.B. 8.
-" See text accompanying notes 67-74 infra.
5 I.R.C. § 170; see text accompanying notes 67-74 infra.
" I.R.C. § 213.
" Revenue Rulings 78-38 and 78-39 are expressly limited by the IRS to three party bank
credit cards. 1978-5 I.R.B. 7, 8.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).
I.R.C. § 217.
" I.R.C. § 274(a).
I.R.C. § 218. In lieu of taking the § 218 deduction, a taxpayer may elect, however, to
take the § 41 credit.
"See note 4 supra.
I.R.C. § 441.
5 Under I.R.C. § 63(b), taxable income is computed by subtracting deductions from
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month period called the taxable year. 9 An individual taxpayer's income
can be 'computed by any method the taxpayer desires so long as the
accounting procedure used clearly reflects income." One such method
allowed by the IRS under this standard is the "cash receipts and dis-
bursements method,"7' more commonly referred to as the "cash method."7
Under this method of accounting, all items which constitute income are
included in the taxable year in which they actually are received.7 3 A cash
method taxpayer may not take advantage of a deduction for tax purposes
until actual payment of a deductible expense or contribution is made to
the party to whom the obligation is owing.7' The IRS apparently intended
the cash method to apply to credit cards. In Revenue Ruling 71-216, the
determinative issue was whether the cardholder had "actually paid" his
deduction. 5 This concept of actual payment is a fundamental principle of
cash basis accounting" which determines when a deduction may be
claimed. Therefore, actual payment was a preliminary consideration with
respect to credit card analysis in Revenue Ruling 71-216.
The IRS viewed the concept of "payment" differently in Revenue Rul-
ings 71-216 and 78-38, resulting in the different analyses used to support
each ruling. Revenue Ruling 71-216 involved a taxpayer who claimed a
charitable deduction after having charged a contribution on his bank
credit card.77 The charitable organization received an immediate credit
when they deposited the sales slip with the issuing bank,78 but the card-
holder did not pay the issuer of the credit card until he was billed by the
adjusted gross income. Adjusted gross income is computed by subtracting the deductions
found in I.R.C. § 62 from gross income. See generally I.R.C. §§ 61-63.
" I.R.C. § 441(b); see note 16 supra.
7* I.R.C. § 446(b); see Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352, 356 (1st Cir.
1970); Commissioner v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 394 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1968);
[1978] 4 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 1 20,066.
71 I.R.C. § 446(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163. The IRS
also permits a taxpayer to use the accrual method of accounting in computing income. I.R.C.
§ 446(c)(2). Under this method, a taxpayer reports income in the tax year that it is earned,
regardless of when it is actually paid. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Gillis
v. United States, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. H.B. Ives Co., 297 F.2d 229
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904 (1963); see 2 J. MERTES, LAW OF FEDmAL INcoME
TAXAT ON §§ 12.60 - 12.94 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MERTES]; [1978] 4 FED. TAXES (P-
H) 20,140, 20,570. As a corollary, a taxpayer may deduct expenses only in the tax year in
which they are incurred, even if they have not yet been paid. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2),
T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163; MERTENS, supra at §§ 12.86 - 12.94; [1978] 4 FED. TA XFs (P-H)
$20,570.
" MERTENS, supra note 71, at § 12.38.
" Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163; see MERTENS, supra note 71,
at § 12.39; [1978] 4 FED. TAxEs (P-H) 20,133.
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1), T.D. 6917, 1967-1 C.B. 108; see Helveringv. Price, 309 U.S.
409 (1940); Benn v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1966); Perry v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 508 (1968); MERTENS, supra note 71, at § 12.53; [1978] 4 FED. TA Es (P-H) 20,560.
11 See text accompanying notes 67-74 supra.
7' Id.
n 1971-1 C.B. at 96.
18 Id.; see text accompanying notes 26-28 & 33 supra.
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bank in the next taxable year. 9 The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was
entitled to take the deduction only at that later date. 0 The Service relied
on an income tax regulation8" in reasoning that "a deduction is allowable
to an individual under section 170 of the Code only for charitable contribu-
tions actually paid during the taxable year, regardless of when pledged
* * "8 A prior IRS revenue rulinge was then cited in comparing payment
of a charitable contribution by a credit card charge with payment by a
promissory note.u That ruling held that since a promissory note evidences
a future obligation, the delivery of the note to a charity is not actual
payment for the purpose of claiming a charitable deduction., This is con-
sistent with the rule of cash method accounting that a deduction can be
claimed by a taxpayer only when payment has been made to the party to
whom the obligation is owing.8 No payment in the tax sense occurs at the
time the promissory note is created, but occurs at a later date when the
promissor repays the promissee.87 The IRS construed the concept of pay-
ment in a similar manner with respect to the taxpayer's use of a credit
card. The credit cardholder apparently was considered to be in the same
position as the promissor of the note." Thus, Revenue Ruling 71-216 held
that the cardholder had "actually paid" the deduction claimed only when
payment was made to the issuing bank. 9
After its publication, commentators criticized Revenue Ruling 71-216
as being impractical and inconsistent with federal tax theory concerning
the timing of deductions in general." In particular, the promissory note
analysis was viewed as being incorrect" when applied to the three-party
credit card arrangement. 2 The ruling misconceived the proper relationship
71 1971-1 C.B. at 96.
9 Id.
11 Tress. Reg. § 1.170-2(a)(1).
2 1971-1 C.B. at 96 (emphasis in original).
Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. 81.
M 1971-1 C.B. at 96.
1968-1 C.B. at 83.
u The IRS relied on the Tax Court's statement in Petty v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 521
(1963), that "[t]he general rule has always been that, under the cash method of accounting,
there must be actual payment as a prerequisite to a deduction, that is, there must be an
outlay of cash or property, and that the giving of a promissory note does not constitute actual
payment." Id. at 524 (Atkins, J., concurring); see Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. 81; [1978] 4
FED. TAXEs (P-H) 20,564.
Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. at 81.
1971-1 C.B. at 96.
"Id.
"See FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENs, supra note 6, at 552-53. For an excellent discus-
sion of the practical problems of and faulty rationale of Revenue Ruling 71-216, see Instant
Deduction, supra note 53.
11 See text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
12 See Instant Deduction, supra note 53, at 1392-95. Promissory note analysis is consis-
tent with the two-party credit card. Under the bipartite arrangement, the issuer-merchant
extends credit to the cardholder in exchange for the latter's promise to pay at a later date.
NoRwsmoM, supra note 4, § 117, at 347. This agreement is analogous to the promissory note
1978] S1097
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between the cardholder and the merchant. With the publication of Reve-
nue Ruling 78-38, the IRS now takes the position that the time of payment
for tax purposes occurs at the time of the transaction between the mer-
chant and the cardholder and not when the actual cash disbursement is
made to the issuing bank following the cardholder's receipt of the bill.
9 3
The new ruling takes into account the fact that a third party, the issuing
bank, pays the obligation owing to the merchant on behalf of the card-
holder."
Normally, for a taxpayer to claim a tax deduction under the cash basis
method, he must pay the expense himself. 5 Nevertheless, a taxpayer can
have a third party make payment for him and properly claim a deduction."
Under the tripartite credit card. arrangement, the cardholder has author-
ized the issuing bank to pay the obligation to the merchant for him. 7 The
issuing bank is considered to have made a loan to the cardholder between
the time the bank pays the merchant and the cardholder repays the bank."
Thus, under this "loan theory" the bank is deemed to have "actually paid"
the obligation to the merchant enabling the cardholder to claim a deduc-
tion under the IRC. In contrast, under the two-party arrangement of the
promissory note, the delivery of the note does not constitute actual pay-
ment.9 While the merchant has loaned money to the promissor, a deduc-
tion may not be claimed until the merchant is repaid.1" Revenue Ruling
78-38 adopts the loan theory reasoning that the charge to the bank credit
card immediately indebted the cardholder to the bank as a third party, "in
such a way that the cardholder could not thereafter prevent the charitable
organization from receiving payment."'' ° Moreover, the obligation of the
and its treatment for tax accounting purposes. See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra. The
cardholder, under a bipartite system, may claim a deduction only in the year in which he
actually repays the merchant. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
" 1978-5 I.R.B. at 8.
"Id.
's See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Welch, 119 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1941) (no
deduction allowed to state bank where national bank paid debts of state bank according to
consolidation agreement).
" See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 345 F.2d 823 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (deduc-
tion allowed to bank for payment of gross receipts tax by company to which the bank's assets
were assigned); MmENs, supra note 71, at § 12.54; [1978] 4 FED. TAXES (P-H) 20,560,
20,562(10).
"T The loan theory is consistent with treatment of credit cards under U.C.C.C. §
1.301(25)(a)(ii)(1974 version), which provides that a loan includes:
the creation of debt pursuant to a lender credit card in any manner, including a
cash advance or the card issuer's honoring a draft or similar order for the payment
of money drawn or accepted by the debtor, paying or agreeing to pay the debtor's
obligation, or purchasing or otherwise acquiring the debtor's obligation from the
obligee or his assignees.
" 1978-5 I.R.B. at 8; see text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
0 Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. 81.
'"Id. at 83; see text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
'" 1978-5 I.R.B. at 8. The apparent adoption of the loan theory by the IRS is further
suported by additional language in the ruling: "[tihe use of a bank credit card to make a
charitable contribution is equivalent to the use of borrowed funds .... Id.
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cardholder to the charity is extinguished when the charity deposits the
sales slip with the issuing bank and receives payment. 12 In contrast, since
a promissory note constitutes a "mere promise to pay at some future
date"'' 3 and the maker of the note may eventually default on this promise,
certainty of payment does not exist. Therefore, the obligation owing to the
charitable organization that has received a promissory note is not satisfied
until actual payment is received. 1
The use of the loan analysis by the IRS is consistent with accepted
principles of cash basis income tax accounting, especially with respect to
deductions. Under the loan rationale, deductible expenses paid with bor-
rowed funds by a cash basis taxpayer are deductible at the time they are
paid, not when the loan is repaid."5 The bank credit card arrangement fits
logically under this rule. The actual moment at which a cardholder charges
an expense or purchase on his bank credit card is a recorded event, evi-
denced by the credit card sales slip."' Thus, the specific time of a claimed
deduction is easily ascertainable by both the taxpayer and the IRS. This
gives the taxpayer control over the timing of deductions claimed by credit
card charges and enables the IRS to match taxpayer payments with
claimed deductions conveniently. In contrast, the timing of repayment to
the issuing bank may or may not be a specific event, depending upon
whether a single reimbursement or a series of installment payments is
chosen by the cardholder in repaying the bank."17 This becomes important
near the end of a taxable year when the precise timing of deductions may
have a significant effect on the taxpayer's liability for that year."8
In addition to an implied analogy to the loan rationale, Revenue Ruling
78-38 also implies that payment by credit card is similar to payment by
check."' Historically, when a buyer purchased goods or services by check,
actual payment to the merchant was not deemed to have occurred until
the check was honored on presentment"' to the depositary bank."' Re-
See text accompanying note 92 supra; text accompanying notes 103-04 infra.
" Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. at 83.
" Id. For tax purposes, the deduction can be claimed upon actual payment to the
charity by the bank. Under the new revenue rulings, this allows the deduction to be taken
when the issuing bank pays the merchant or charitable organization. 1978-5 I.R.B. 7, 8. If
the cardholder fails to pay the bank thereafter, the bank bears the risk of nonpayment, not
the merchant or charitable organization. See note 4 supra; text accompanying notes 34 & 35
supra. However, the taxpayer/cardholder will lose the deduction. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314; [1978]
4 FED. TAXES (P-H) 20,619, 20,625.
"I Granan v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 753 (1971) (medical expense deduction); Keenan
v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 498 (1930) (ordinary and necessary business expenses); Weis v.
Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 1284 (1928) (deduction of losses); [1978] 4 Fm. TAXES (P-H)
20,562.
"I See note 38 supra.
117 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
'I' See note 16 supra.
' 1978-5 I.R.B. at 8.
It Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment by the depositary bank of the
maker's check by the holder. U.C.C. § 3-504 (1972 version).
M Dodge v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 201, 220 (1928).
1978] 1099
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cently, the courts have modified their position and treated payment by
check in the same fashion as payment by cash.1 12 Under this modified
position, unconditional delivery of a check constitutes payment if the bank
subsequently certifies the check on presentment."3 In theory, the check
represents a "conditional payment" of the underlying obligation"' which
becomes "absolute payment" when the check is honored on presentment
to the bank."' Thus, the actual cash disbursement at the time of present-
ment is deemed to relate back to the actual delivery of the check."' The
approach of Revenue Ruling 78-38 is consistent with the present principles
of tax accounting regarding deduction of payments made by check since
it treats the charge of a credit card in a similar fashion to the delivery of a
check. This is significant in light of the similarities between tripartite
credit cards and checks. A merchant who accepts a bank credit card or
check usually thinks of the sale as a cash transaction, not a credit one."'
Both commercial devices involve forms of payment to the merchant that
provide him with significant assurance that he will receive value for the
goods sold or services rendered."'
Upon publication of Revenue Ruling 78-38, the IRS reversed a seven
year policy which had clouded an important area of income tax deductions
involving the use of bank credit cards. Since 1971, persons who had used
credit cards and then claimed deductions were subject to an IRS policy
that fostered theoretical uncertainty concerning the timing of deductions
claimed at the end of each taxable year."' Revenue Ruling 78-38 presents
a more realistic approach to the nature and mechanics of tripartite credit
card transactions and gives the taxpayer more control and certainty con-
cerning the effective use of the bank credit card with respect to deductions.
More importantly, the ruling recognizes that society has begun to view
credit card transactions with the same acceptance as cash or checks. 2 '
JAMES C. OLSON
122 FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS, supra note 6, at 552; see cases cited in note 113 infra.
,,2 See Flint v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 551 (D. Idaho 1964); Estate of Modie J.
Spiegel, 12 T.C. 524 (1949); Estate of M.A. Bradley, 19 B.T.A. 49 (1930), aff'd 56 F.2d 728
(6th Cir. 1932); MERTENS, supra note 71, at § 12.54; [1978] 4 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 20,561.
But see Eagleton v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1938) (deduction denied to cash basis
taxpayer where check given with the understanding that it would not be cashed in current
tax year); Griffin v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 253 (1967) (postdated check is the equivalent of
a promissory note, thus not deductible on delivery).
'" Clark v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1958); see U.C.C. §§ 2-511(3), 3-
802 (1972 version) (acceptance and payment of check occurs on presentment.)
1,5 Clark v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1958).
,,8 Estate of M.A. Bradley, 19 B.T.A. 49, 51 (1930).
", FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS, supra note 6, at 552.
,,8 The credit card actually may be less risky for the merchant. Since a check constitutes
conditional payment, see text accompanying notes 109-17 supra, the possibility of dishonor
still exists when the check is presented to the bank for payment or credit. See note 110 supra.
In contrast, the merchant will receive credit for the credit card sales slips delivered to the
bank, whether the cardholder eventually pays the issuer or not. See text accompanying notes
26-28 & 32 supra.
"' See note 16 supra.
12 FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS, supra note 6, at 553.
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